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REMARKS: This was prepared for O/NE and circulated last week to concerned Staff members in typescript. Have asked for comment to prepare reply. Looks like a very fine job. B.

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30 APRIL 1952

PROPAGANDA EVIDENCES CONCERNING
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

(An analysis of Soviet and Chinese comment on the 1951 and 1952 anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet treaty)

A detailed study of Chinese and Soviet press and radio propaganda surrounding the 1951 and 1952 anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance suggests that:

1. There are differences concerning Soviet aid to China. The issue of Soviet aid is related to the Korean war.
2. There appears to be a minor struggle to determine China's status in the Communist orbit. The evidence, however, does not point to the possibility of a Chinese "Titoist break."
3. A divergence of interests is developing with regard to Japan. (The evidence is less firm here than in the preceding cases.)
4. Despite possible differences, the similarity in volume and direction of Chinese and Soviet propaganda indicates that relations have not deteriorated.
5. The Soviet Union is not making a concerted effort to "woo" a disgruntled China.
6. Soviet broadcasts to China are clearly avoiding the subject of Soviet advisors in China.
7. China is sensitive regarding the portrait of its ideological role which is presented to the Chinese people.

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GENERAL APPROACH

FDD-FBID have proceeded on the assumption that neither Soviet nor Chinese propaganda would directly express annoyance or hostility to or about each other. It was felt that some variations might appear which would indirectly reflect the existence of difficulties between the partners and which could not be explained away on the grounds of propaganda techniques. (For example, it has been claimed that Soviet failure to comment on the Far Eastern situation to the same extent as China revealed difficulties between the two. The fact is, however, that Moscow is habitually more general in its comments on local situations than is the propaganda of the orbit state immediately concerned, e.g. East Germany on Germany, the Satellites on Yugoslavia, China on Southeast Asia, etc.) Therefore, FDD-FBID scrutinized the appearance, deletion, and shifts in emphasis on the propaganda themes used in the celebration of the Sino-Soviet anniversary in 1951 and 1952.

In the absence of firm objective intelligence on the nature and direction of possible animosities between the Soviet Union and China, two methods were used in examining the propaganda evidence available:

1. The propaganda data was examined to see whether any of the differences in propaganda emphasis might suggest areas of disagreement.
2. The existence of differences was posited, propaganda policies were deduced in the light of these assumed differences (chiefly in terms of themes to be emphasized or avoided), and then the propaganda evidence was examined to see whether the patterns observed supported or contradicted the propaganda policies deduced.

FDD-FBID has attempted herewith not only to present the propaganda "facts" but has also attempted to offer possible tentative explanations of the observed differences. It was felt that the data would be more valuable if the hypotheses and inferences were presented explicitly rather than implicitly. The observations made in this paper are drawn from propaganda alone.

This report is given in four sections: Section I discusses possible areas of discord suggested by the propaganda, Section II presents the evidence suggesting harmonious relations, Section III outlines deductively what propaganda elements would be present if the Soviets were attempting to appease a disgruntled China and then examines the evidence in the light of these assumptions, and finally Section IV presents certain observations of general relevance to the subject of Sino-Soviet relations.

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The following Tabs are appended:

Tab A: Outline of sample used and the quantitative analysis techniques employed and the list of categories.

Tab B: Chart presenting the quantitative data in summary form.

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SECTION I -- AREAS OF DISCORD

The propaganda behavior of Communist China and the Soviet Union gives no indication of a general deterioration of relations between these two states. There are indications, however, that several points of friction may exist (at least as of February 1952) and that these areas of difficulty primarily concern the interests of the Chinese People's Republic.

1. There appear to be differences concerning Soviet aid to China. The issue of aid is apparently connected with the Korean war.
2. It seems possible that a struggle may be in process over the delineation of Communist China's status in the Communist world. This struggle does not appear to be crucial at present; that is, it does not appear to warrant predictions of a "Titoist break."
3. There are indications of a possible clash of interests regarding Japan, but the propaganda evidence is less than in the preceding cases.

1. Indications of Differences Concerning Soviet Aid to China: The most marked differences in Soviet and Chinese propaganda about the anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is related to Soviet aid to China. In 1951 Chinese propaganda media gave somewhat more stress to this topic than did Soviet media. Such propaganda behavior seems appropriate to a situation in which a grateful China assumes the major burden of publicizing the Soviet gesture.

In 1952, however, the situation was completely reversed. Chinese sources sharply reduced their attention to Soviet aid, while the Soviet media showed a marked rise in attention to the topic. The shift appears more meaningful in view of the fact that the Sino-Soviet patterns of attention to most of the other categories remained approximately the same.

Another significant change in the propaganda pattern concerns attention to "Western aggression." In 1951, both Chinese and Soviet media gave major attention to this topic, Soviet sources giving it slightly more stress. Again, such propaganda behavior seems appropriate to the objective situation. Communist China was at war with the West in Korea, and for the Soviet media to make bellicose charges against the West in the same volume as China bespoke accord concerning the war in Korea.

A year later, however, Soviet attention to Western aggression was considerably less, while Chinese attention remained much as it was in 1951. Paralleling this development, there was a decrease in

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Soviet attention to Korea per se* while China maintained attention to this area at about the same level as that of 1951.

Third, there was a sharp decline in the volume of both sides' references to collaboration and cooperation. In 1951 both gave considerable attention to this subject; this would seem to be an appropriate propaganda reflection of harmonious relations between the two. In 1952, both made significantly fewer references to this subject.

These appear to be the major differences in Communist Chinese and Soviet propaganda which reflect a possible area of discord between the two nations. In each case, there was a shift away from that propaganda behavior which appeared most commensurate with mutually satisfactory relations.

Assuming that the drain of the Korean war has been a major factor contributing to China's need for aid, these propaganda developments may be inter-related. The decrease of attention to Soviet aid in the Chinese media, at a time when the Chinese audience most required such assurance, may reflect Chinese dissatisfaction concerning aid. General agreement in de-emphasizing the topic is precluded by the increased Soviet attention. The increased Soviet attention to the subject of aid suggests an attempt to appease Chinese dissatisfaction and to compensate for the Chinese de-emphasis.

The drop in Soviet attention to Western aggression and to the Korean war and continued Chinese attention to these subjects seems to indicate a change of Soviet attitudes and tactics, which China, because of its vital interests, did not wish to parallel. This inferred difference of interests regarding Korea lends itself to a logical construction of the propaganda picture--the Soviet audience hears less about China's major problem, Korea, and more about Soviet aid to China; the Chinese audience, on the other hand, still hears a great deal about China's struggle in Korea, and much less about the aid it is receiving.

It therefore appears that the simultaneous decrease in attention to Sino-Soviet collaboration may be a consequence of the above two developments, and may well be a reflection of fact: if differences have arisen over Soviet aid, then collaboration, at least on these points, has probably been reduced. Furthermore, since declarations of collaboration and cooperation usually involve an issue to be "collaborated on," it may be possible that both sides are reluctant to be committed to the other on specific matters because of their differing interests.

* It should be noted that there was a general decline in attention to aggression charges and to the Korean war between the first quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952. It was not possible to determine whether the anniversary propaganda was directly affected by the general decline.

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2. Individualization and the Struggle for Status: Chinese media show a distinct tendency to focus on China (as opposed to focusing on mutual relations). This individualization was developed at the expense of references to China and the Soviet Union as acting in concert or having similar or identical motives, purposes, or intentions. It also occurred at the expense of individual references to the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Chinese press and radio in 1952 talked more about China, less about the Soviet Union, and less about the two together. The Soviet press and radio in 1952, on the other hand, behaved as it did in 1951, maintaining and even increasing slightly the generally high level of mutual references. Soviet sources did show one marked change, however: there was a sharp increase in the number of individual references to the Soviet Union's contributions to China.

This tendency toward individualization and self-depiction evident in the Chinese media coincides with the ever-enlarging role of Communist China in world and orbit affairs, and as such, this coincidence may reflect the Chinese leaders' awareness of China's world status. The only significant change in the Soviet media was the increased attention to the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, it appears that Soviet propaganda reacted to the drop in attention to the USSR in the Chinese media by coupling an emphasis on the USSR with its basic effort to identify the purposes and policies of the two countries.

Although these developments suggest a Chinese effort to have China's status defined in a satisfactory measure, there are qualifying elements which suggest that this shift is a matter of "normal politiking" between China and the Communist world and the Soviet Union in particular. In other words, the qualifying evidence contradicts the possibility that China's dissatisfaction is sufficiently great that it would consider rapprochement with the West as an alternative to decreasing its aspirations for intra-orbit status. Specifically, Chinese media increase attention to the theme that the Soviet Union is the "teacher" or source of guidance for China. This increase is within a low numerical range, but exists, nonetheless. Also, although Soviet sources showed a marked increase of individual self-references, the level of individual references to China was increased in 1952, and these, as in 1951, were concerned with the achievements of Communist China. The fact that China promotes the idea of Soviet leadership and guidance appears to modify its struggle for status to a matter of "politiking" for position within a range whose extremes are marked by satellite status and favored lieutenant of the Soviet Union. The Soviet propaganda tributes to China's successes indicate that the Soviet Union is certainly not playing down China's role in the Communist camp. Also, the area of harmony in the propaganda of both nations is of sufficient breadth to suggest general accord.

3. The Difference in Attention to Japan: In 1951 both nations devoted considerable attention to Japan as a source of aggression in the Far East. In 1952, on the other hand, there was a basic change

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in the pattern of attention to Japan. In 1951 Japan received almost parallel attention from both Chinese and Soviet sources and in 1952 both nations diminished attention to Japan. Soviet attention declined more sharply with Chinese sources giving it attention about four times as great as the Soviet media. One factor accentuating this changed propaganda relationship is the fact that in 1951 a campaign against Japanese rearmament was in full swing on the Chinese mainland when the Sino-Soviet Pact anniversary occurred. Therefore, some drop in attention to Japan could be expected from Chinese media in 1952 when no such campaign was in progress. But there is no such ready explanation for the drop in Soviet attention to Japan. One factor which may be related to the decreased Soviet attention was the Stalin message of friendship to the Japanese people which was sent only a few weeks before the Pact anniversary.

Attention to Japan, as recorded in this project, appears to be a function of attention to the subject of aggression for the largest single decrease of attention to Japan occurs in the aggression category. Decreased Soviet attention to Japan and aggression in the Japanese context, then, coincides with the over-all changes in Soviet propaganda and the possible changes in attitude or tactics which the propaganda changes may reflect.

But China's propaganda attention suggests no change of attitude toward Japan. Therefore, it appears that Soviet attitudes or tactics may diverge from the Chinese pattern. This in turn suggests the possibility of a shift away from the compatibility which formerly marked Sino-Soviet attitudes toward Japan.

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SECTION II -- EVIDENCES OF SINO-SOVIET ACCORD

While there is some propaganda evidence to suggest the above-mentioned areas of discord in Sino-Soviet relations, the primary characteristics of the comment suggest general accord between the two nations. At least they do not indicate a state of general discord between them. Both nations give comparable and high-level attention to Sino-Soviet friendship. Chinese attention underwent a slight decline, but remained at a high level, while Soviet attention increased within a high-level range. The treatment of strength, peaceful intent, and resistance to aggression was basically the same in Soviet and Chinese propaganda in 1951 and 1952. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that China increased attention to the leadership and guidance of the Soviet Union. Also significant is the decline in the media of both nations of references to equality.

Although the increased Chinese tendency toward individualization suggests some friction stemming from China's desire for individual status, the total picture--especially the elements listed above--seems to indicate basic agreement. This is substantiated by the Soviet sources' endorsement of China's self-praise, that is, both sides gave comparable, high-level attention to Chinese achievements. The failure of China to sustain or increase references to the topic of equality coincides with Soviet de-emphasis on this subject and suggests, therefore, some measure of agreement between the two on the exploitation of this significant theme.

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SECTION III -- THE DEDUCTIVE APPROACH

Because of the lack of time, this section will not attempt to outline all the major possible combinations of annoyance or accord between the two partners. Rather, one particular situation has been assumed for purposes of analysis and has been elaborated for illustrative purposes. The situation chosen seemed at least as plausible as others that might have been chosen.

On the purely hypothetical assumption that there were difficulties between the USSR and China of a serious enough nature to be reflected in the propaganda, an attempt has been made to posit how the Soviet Union might alter its themes in order to appeal to its partner. For this purpose, it is specifically assumed that the Chinese Communists are annoyed with their Soviet partners and that the latter are attempting to ameliorate this feeling.

1. Statements Which Moscow Might Play Down or Completely Ignore:

- a. The USSR is the teacher, model or guide for China (in order to avoid offending Chinese nationalist sentiments.)

While this category is low, it remains remarkably level with last year's attention. Moreover, in three elite sources* it has increased slightly but consistently from 1950 through 1952. The absence of a decrease does not suggest a Soviet desire to avoid the possibility of offending its partner.

- b. "Need" statements, namely, that Soviet backing of China is a prerequisite to Chinese advance, current and historical.

While such claims are extremely infrequent (less than 1%), there has been a slight increase (although the difference is not statistically significant.) In any event, they do not disappear from Soviet output entirely. In one case, however, a "need" statement was edited out of a Home Service commentary when the commentary was broadcast in Mandarin. Again, the fact that Soviet propaganda does not take pains to completely eliminate these statements does not demonstrate extreme sensitivity to Chinese feelings.

* A comparison was made of the same three sources--editorials in PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, and LITERARY GAZETTE--over a three-year period, thus including comment on the occasion of the signing of the original pact. This allows a more reliable perspective on the nature of the comment.

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- c. Claims that the two powers' "interests"* are served by the Pact (in order to avoid the implication that China's alliance with the Soviet Union results from necessity rather than choice.)

Soviet references to "interests" almost disappeared in 1952, although they had been present (at a very low level) in the previous two years. However, the importance of this seems diminished by the fact that the equally infrequent Chinese references to this category last year disappeared entirely in 1952.

- d. Allusions to Stalin:

There is little evidence that Moscow appreciably and in general played down Stalin as the inspiration for Chinese successes as compared to last year's anniversary. It is true, however, that the effusive praise usually accorded him in most contexts is generally lower in discussion of the USSR's relations with China.

And in at least one verified case there seems to be a clear toning down of praise for Stalin. This instance occurs in a commentary broadcast both to the home audience and to China, both versions of which are available. The version heard by Russian listeners says (albeit quoting a Chinese source): "Every single one of our achievements we owe to the Soviet Union and the great Stalin." In the Mandarin-language version, this statement becomes "The Chinese people are grateful for the just aid of the USSR and voice their praise of Comrade Stalin."

* Soviet propaganda habitually avoids references to the "interests" of the USSR, probably because most of its propaganda themes are framed in "moral" rather than "pragmatic" terms. Moreover, references to "interests" tend to suggest self-involvement; this is a picture that Moscow avoids. (For example, the recent Soviet popular protest meetings over bacterial warfare were only the third round of such meetings since the war, as contrasted to innumerable Satellite "protests."

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2. Statements Which Moscow Might Emphasize or Play Up:

- a. Explicit references to "equality" (in order to reassure the Chinese of their coordinate rather than subordinate role in the Pact.)

The evidence on this point is negative. Total references to equality decline in 1952. Judging by the three editorials, attention to this category was about the same in 1950 and 1951 but declined in 1952. Chinese references to equality also declined in 1952. This seems contrary to the presumption that they would increase if the Chinese desired to remind the USSR of China's coordinate rights.

- b. Celebrations of the anniversary by the Soviet people (in order to imply equality of the relationship)

There is some evidence suggesting that Radio Moscow broadcast several programs in 1952-- apparently absent in 1951--which actually described (rather than merely claiming the occurrence of) anniversary celebrations in Soviet cities. They were broadcast to the Chinese people only. Thus on 15 February, Moscow's Mandarin shows contained reports describing anniversary celebrations, exhibits of Chinese books in Moscow, Chinese motion pictures shown, and lectures and parties held in various parts of the USSR.

It might be added that these elements were broadcast only in Mandarin, and that similar celebration material is not usual in the propaganda surrounding anniversaries with other Satellites. The interjection of this type of propaganda seems particularly calculated to present a picture of a mutual partnership.

- c. Praise for China's specific contributions to the USSR (in order to defer to Chinese nationalism and prestige). The manner in which the propaganda refers to Chinese-Soviet relations can take three forms. For example, in discussing collaboration, the propagandists can allude to mutual collaboration, Soviet collaboration with China or vice versa.

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While most of the references in both years are framed in terms of mutual relationships (closely followed by the Soviet-to-China relationship), it is at least plausible that the smaller category of China-to-Soviet relationship might increase in 1952, given a Soviet desire to appeal to China.

An examination of the evidence, however, does not reveal this to be the case. In fact in the largest single category--Chinese achievements--Soviet sources show no hesitancy in attributing Chinese advances to Soviet help and inspiration. Specific discussions of Chinese aid,* friendship, collaboration and trade with the USSR show, if anything, a slight decrease in 1952 as compared with 1951.

Thus, there is no apparent effort by the USSR to institute even a minimal appeal to Chinese pride.

- d. Discussions of cultural relations, particularly from China to the USSR. (Emphasis on the latter would represent a gratuitous compliment to Chinese culture and its impact on the USSR; presumably it would appeal to Chinese nationalism.)

Within the sample of material measured, Soviet sources increased only slightly their references to culture. On the specific issue of China's cultural contributions to the USSR, there was no increase during the second year. Rather, there was an increase in the number of acknowledgements of Soviet cultural contributions to China. The 1952 increase was of small magnitude however.**

An examination of the titles of the 1952 Soviet broadcasts to China--not included in the sample because they were unavailable in Washington--would indicate that there was more stress on culture this year than last. Although no firm observation can be made as to the direction of cultural flow, it is perhaps indicative that Radio Moscow broadcast a program covering the celebration of the anniversary by a group of "Chinese actors now in the Soviet Union."

* Only five such references occurred, and then in a 1952 radio commentary broadcast only in Mandarin.

** The PRAVDA editorials in both years are careful not to allude to Soviet cultural contributions to China without immediately alluding to contributions in the other direction.

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It is interesting that Chinese sources gave some attention to both their own cultural achievements and their own cultural impact on Russia; both were absent last year.

- e. Praise for Chinese achievements (in order to appeal to Chinese nationalism).

The evidence on this point favors the hypothesis that the Soviets are gratuitously playing to Chinese pride more this year than last.*

Not only does this category show an increase but most of that increase reflects Soviet statements about Chinese successes unrelated to Soviet aid and guidance.

- f. Praise of Mao (in order to appease wounded pride).

The propaganda gives no evidence that Mao is singled out for even the mildest heroization. Not only do the total number of references remain small, but the manner in which Mao is characterized remains restrained--thus the PRAVDA editorial calls him "experienced" but calls the Chinese Communist Party "glorious." Not even in the comment beamed to China is there any apparent effort to play up Mao.

3. Comparison of the Propaganda Evidence:

Assuming the correctness of the hypotheses postulated above, there is no clear and consistent pattern suggesting a Soviet attempt to appeal to a China which is clearly at odds with the Soviet Union. While there is some data which could be interpreted as an attempt to play up to Chinese sensibilities (by stressing Soviet celebrations, Chinese cultural contributions to the USSR, and Chinese achievements), no extreme avoidances of presumably more sensitive themes (Stalin, interests, needs, and teacher) are noted this year.

* The chart in Tab B concerning the category of achievements shows a broken line for Soviet references to the category in 1951. This was done because one item in the sample--a single voice commentary broadcast in Mandarin--contained such a large number of references to Chinese achievements as to make it completely unrepresentative. A correction made for this bias would reduce the incidence of this category to about 5.9%, indicated on the chart as a plus line.

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SECTION IV -- OTHER OBSERVATIONS

1. Soviet Sensitivity Displayed in Discussing "Advisors": There is clear evidence that the Soviet radio is carefully avoiding the whole question of Soviet experts in China in the commentaries it beams to Chinese listeners. The evidence is based on the following points:

- a. On 7 February, Radio Moscow broadcast a commentary by Vysokov, a PRAVDA correspondent in China. It was broadcast to China and to the Soviet home audience only; FBID was able to obtain both versions. Whereas the Home Service version contained 13 allusions to the work of Soviet advisors in China (more than a third of the entire commentary), the version beamed to China contained only one such reference. This marked reduction in emphasis does not appear to be the result of mere chance editing.
- b. Another commentary beamed to China gave very heavy emphasis (over half) to the subject of Soviet aid but completely avoided any references to Soviet advisors. Most of the references to advisors which did occur in the press and radio were made in the context of aid, a fact which points up the omission of advisors in this case.
- c. The omission of allusions to advisors cannot be explained on the ground that Soviet media generally played the subject down, for a PRAVDA correspondent in China devotes almost half of his article to praising the assistance rendered China by Soviet experts. This commentary, however, was beamed only to two European Satellite audiences (of interest in itself, as Moscow rarely discusses its advisors there).
- d. Almost all of the little comment on advisors occurs in quotations from Chinese workers and newspapers.

While there is firm evidence that Soviet sources are sensitive on the subject of advisors, the facts suggest that this sensitivity results from a Soviet desire not to offend the Chinese people rather than the Chinese leaders. While it is true that elite sources (i.e. speeches by prominent leaders and major newspaper editorials) on both sides allude to advisors a very few times,* Chinese regional sources and secondary Soviet material do not demonstrate anything like an extreme avoidance of the subject. Assuming the subject was a sore point with Chinese leaders, it might be expected that Soviet leaders would eliminate virtually all references to advisors from all of their propaganda. This they have done only in their Mandarin-language broadcasts.

* It is plausible to expect that these sources, which receive greater international attention than does routine local propaganda, would lean over backwards to avoid any implication that the USSR dominates China via its "experts."

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2. Chinese Sensitivity Concerning its Ideological Role: There is some indication that the Communist Chinese elite is sensitive about the depiction of its role in the ideological framework of Communism. FBID was able to obtain two versions of a 1951 Peking commentary on the dissemination of ideological literature in Sinkiang, one in English Morse to North America and one in Chinese Numeral Code to the Chinese press. In the version beamed to the West, reference was made to the dissemination of the works of "Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin." In the version directed to the Chinese audience, Peking changed the passage to include "Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Liu Shao-chi."

This differentiation in the text of the same commentary, released by the same source, NCNA, appears to be more than happenstance. This occurrence suggests a desire on the part of the Chinese radio to strengthen the prestige of Communist Chinese ideological development in the eyes of the Chinese public by presenting it on a par with traditional Communist ideology.

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Tab APROPOSED ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The analytical method employed in attempting to determine the state of relations existing between the Soviet Union and Communist China takes into consideration what (content) is said by these two nations (communicators) about each other (actors) or about significant issues or areas (contexts) on the occasion of Sino-Soviet Pact anniversaries (events), and also how much (quantity) these factors appear in content directed to specific audiences.

In order to gather such information and to group it into meaningful patterns it is proposed that the analysis should include the recording of all meaning units (each idea represented in a sentence by a subject and predicate) contained in the sample of text materials which fall into one of the categories of content listed below.

- I. Sample: The sample will include press materials from leading newspapers and periodicals of China and the Soviet Union. Insofar as possible, the same newspapers and periodicals will be compared for the different years as will be speeches and articles by the same personages. Similar treatment will be afforded to broadcast materials, although analysis of the beaming of rebroadcasts to different audiences will be limited since most of this information is unavailable. (Such information, however, can be obtained for future periods if there is advance planning in sample selection.)

II. Categories of Content:

Collaboration: Statements of mutual endeavor or agreement and statements of one's support for the other. Such statements are commitments of support.

Example: "We cooperate with each other"; "The USSR has steadfastly upheld China's right to sit in the U.N." (cooperation, support, unity, solidarity; not concrete aid, trade, etc.)

Possible Significance: If China were annoyed at the USSR, it would not emphasize Soviet support of China, while the USSR, if attempting to ease friction, would emphasize its support of China. If the Soviets were reluctant to enter the Far East conflict, the USSR would not emphasize mutual collaboration in military matters, while China might go ahead and do so to appear strong before its opponents. (Other information would be derived from considering to whom such statements are directed, concerning what areas, etc.)

Teacher: Acknowledgments by one (primarily China) that the other is a guide or leader. Implicitly acknowledges different levels of status. Presence indicates that nationalistic considerations are subordinate.

Example: "The USSR is a model for China"; "China learns from the USSR" (model, learn, teach, use experience of, etc.)

Possible Significance: China would not be expected to emphasize Soviet superior knowledge or progress if China were dissatisfied with the USSR. The USSR would not be expected to remind China of the Soviets' teacher status if amiable relations were such that China itself emphasized this line.

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Tab A continued

Equality: Somewhat counter to the "teacher" category. Declarations of equality in status, relations, dealings or treatment. Implicit denial of different levels of status. Presence suggests consideration of nationalistic factors. Code only explicit references.

Example: "Our relations are an example of true equality"; not: "The October Revolution and the Chinese People's Revolution were two great forces affecting world history."

Possible Significance: This category, even more than the others, is meaningful when it changes. It is difficult to postulate a high or low volume of references, so that shifts in volume of this category when related to the volume of "teacher" references would indicate a changing degree of sensitivity to status in the Communist orbit.

Friendship: Explicit declarations of friendship. Absence or decreased volume might indicate annoyance, or preoccupation with a contrary way of discussing Sino-Soviet relations (e.g. in terms of national interests).

Example: "Sino-Soviet friendship grows each day"; "Chinese friendship for Soviet people" (love, sympathy, affection, etc.).

Possible Significance: If China is displeased at the Soviet Union, it will decrease the number of friendship references, especially in comment directed to rural China.

Interests: Statements referring to the interests of China and/or the Soviet Union. (Not characteristic of Communist propaganda.) Implies a different and probably a greater effort to sell a point. Somewhat of a counterpart to "friendship," though it may be purely a supplement to "friendship." Code only references where interests is clearly the central point.

Example: "It is in China's interest to have Soviet friendship"; "China gains from trade with the USSR."

Possible Significance: If China emphasizes its own interests when talking of Sino-Soviet relations to its own people, then there is suggested a serious effort to convince its audience of desirability of Sino-Soviet collusion. The effort suggests a resistance that must be overcome. If it talks in terms of mutual interests, then there is still the suggestion of an effort to convince. If it talks in terms of friendship, without emphasis on interests, then there is apparently no serious resistance to be met by propaganda.

Aid: Statements pertaining to the rendering of concrete aid, one to the other, or mutual. Explicit statements of aid have implications of obligation. Reluctance to emphasize aid suggests a reluctance to emphasize ensuing obligations.

Example:

General Aid: "We have received great assistance from the USSR."

Equipment (and raw materials): "China has sent cotton to the USSR"; "Soviet tractors have arrived in China."

Advisors: (Closely akin to teacher, but actual presence of advisors or experts seem to make this a form of aid) "Soviet advisors help us."

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Tab A continued

Possible Significance: If China is dissatisfied at the amount of Soviet aid, it will not publicize what Soviet aid is forthcoming. If the Soviets are annoyed at Chinese increased demands, or want to alleviate Chinese avoidance of this issue, they will emphasize Soviet aid to China, especially in content directed to Chinese audiences.

Trade: Explicit references to trade either with each other or with other nations. This is an important concrete type of relation between the two nations which may reflect to a considerable degree the state of political relations between the two.

Example: "The exchange of goods between China and the Soviet Union has expanded"; "the trade ties between Japan and China...."

Possible Significance: If the Soviets are unable to supply China with appreciable amounts of required goods, then an increasing number of references to trade with other nations might well be expected from Chinese sources, especially in content directed to external audiences. Soviet media on the other hand might well underplay this subject with references only to the interflow of available goods.

Achievements: Positive statements referring to the successes and achievements of themselves or the other. Praise for the other is a declaration of good relations, implying support. Maybe a category where one nation would attempt to "woo" the other, thus implying a current state of displeasure on the part of the other. Self-praise has implications of nationalism and the necessity of standing alone on certain issues.

Example: "The Chinese economy is flourishing"; "the elimination of corruption has paved the way for production successes."

Possible Significance: If China were displeased at the amount of Soviet aid forthcoming, the USSR might praise the Chinese for their reconstruction successes. China would probably compensate for the dearth of aid by stressing its own successes.

If China were pleased with the Soviets, it would emphasize Soviet achievements. The Soviets would probably divide attention between their own achievements and those of China.

General Strength: References to the might of either, including those to the might of the Pact. Declarations of mutual strength are testimonials of united opposition to the enemy, and in this sense are commitments by one of the other. Most of the implications of the category "achievements" apply here.

Example: "The Sino-Soviet Treaty is a bastion of strength"; the power of 700 million people..."; "China defeated America in Korea."

Possible Significance: If both are in accord on combined opposition to or aggression against the enemy, both will stress mutual strength. If one is reluctant in this regard it will stress the strength of the other, while the less reluctant one will stress mutual strength with its entailed commitment of the other.

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Military Strength: Explicit references to the military strength of either or both; the military aspects of the Alliance.

Example: "The Chinese People's Volunteers will surely defeat the aggressors"; "the Soviet and Chinese Armies are the most formidable in the world."

Possible Significance: Similar to "general strength," but of greater import because of explicit military context.

Culture: Statements pertaining to the influences or development of culture; movement of cultural delegations; cultural displays (movies, books, etc.). This might well be another category where one of the nations would seek to alleviate the annoyance of the other by interjecting praises and declarations of support (neglected in other categories) in the cultural sphere. The treatment of the subject of culture may well be governed by nationalistic sentiments and as such may reflect objective deterrents to closer Sino-Soviet ties.

Example: "The Soviet people are enthusiastic about learning the Chinese language"; "a Chinese cultural delegation arrived in Moscow"; "the Soviet Union can profit from the study of Chinese literature."

Possible Significance: If China is annoyed, it will avoid stressing Soviet cultural achievements, and USSR will emphasize Chinese culture to "woo" China. Both will avoid if there is much Chinese sensitivity.

Resistance-to-Aggression: Declarations of steadfastness or resolve to resist aggression (the explicit reference to aggression must be made). Major importance of this category lies in the fact that it focuses attention on areas and issues. These attention points we must know.

Example: "The Pact provides that both parties will resist the remilitarization of Japan"; "China is resolved to prevent an extension of the Korean War by the Americans."

Possible Significance: If both nations are in accord on measures to be taken in given areas, both will probably commit the other (in references of mutual resolve, etc.) to resist aggression in that area. If one is reluctant, it will refrain from making this type of comment in terms of that area. If one is adamant against being involved in a given area or on a given issue, it may force the other to also refrain from making mutual commitments regarding the issue or area at stake. Thus, one nation will probably avoid stressing the issue, while the other's comment will commit only itself.

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Warnings: A particularized and intense sub-category of "resistance-to-aggression."

Aggression: The actual charges that the United States and/or one of its cohorts intends to aggress against either or both China and the Soviet Union or elsewhere. This category serves pretty much the same purpose as "resistance-to-aggression," i.e. focuses attention on areas and issues, and also is most meaningful in terms of who is aggressing against whom.

Example: "The United States is planning to attack China and the Soviet Union."

Peaceful Intent: Declarations by either or both nations that they do not intend to aggress nor desire to aggress; that they seek peaceful coexistence; that it is known that they do not intend to aggress, etc.

Example: "China does not want war with any country"; "It is well known that the United States lies when it says that China intends to intervene in Vietnam."

NOT: "China wants peace"; "The Soviet Union is a bulwark of peace"; "China and the Soviet Union work for peace"; "China has acquired 300,000,000 signatures to the peace appeal."

Possible Significance: If China were to stress its peaceful intent by denying its aggressive intent while the USSR stressed Western Aggression and not declarations of Soviet and/or Chinese peaceful intent, it might well indicate that China and the USSR did not see eye to eye on the subject of future aggressive measures. This category, however, will probably take on most meaning from its relation to the pattern revealed by attention given to the other categories. This is true of all these categories, but more especially of "peaceful intent" which will be more valuable after the other categories have been analyzed.

III. Contexts and Characterizations: In addition to determining what Communist China and the Soviet Union say which might throw light on the state of relations existing between them, it is essential that how they say these things be noted. When they charge the United States with planning aggression, do they both cite the same locale for the intended aggression? Do they do so consistently and with the same amount of emphasis? When either speaks of Mao Tse-tung or Stalin, do they do so in the same fashion, attributing similar characteristics to these Communist leaders and affording them similar praises? Are they consistent in this? Do they speak of Mao regularly when they speak of Soviet aid, or does this usually occur when the topic of discussion is the achievements of China?

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Such questions essentially ask, "what are the contexts in which the contentions (categories) occur and in what manner are these contentions presented?" To answer this question requires that notations be made of those contentions which are presented in such a fashion or context as to contribute to their meaning. Therefore, the following contexts and characterization categories are proposed to determine the focus of attention of each of the sources, and also to record some of the significant manners in which the content is presented.

<u>Contexts</u>	<u>Characterizations</u>
Treaty Provisions	Mao, Stalin
Collateral Agreements (loan, Dairen, etc.)	Need (e.g. Chinese success depended on Soviet aid)
Korean War	Obligations (parties to Pact must support Japanese resistance)
United Nations (Chinese Admission)	Gratitude (Chinese grateful for aid)
United Nations (Embargo)	
Ideological (October Revolution, etc.)	
Kuomintang (Chiang, Taiwan, etc.)	
Areas (Burma, Japan, Hong Kong, etc.)	

IV. Actor Relations: If an article in a Chinese newspaper contends that China is grateful for Soviet aid, then under the procedure guiding this analysis it would be recorded that a Chinese source made reference to the subject of "aid." But much more than this simple relation of a source to a topic would be noted, for the content itself contained reference to the sources under study (China and the Soviet Union). Such references in the content itself to nations or symbols for nations are termed references to "actors." For example, if the contention is made that "China will resist American aggression," two actors are involved: China and America. Just as sources of content are noted to record who makes the contentions; and just as the audiences are noted to record to whom the contentions are directed; so the actors in a contention are noted in order to record who is said to be doing what to whom.

It is apparent that what nations are spoken about in any contention vitally affects the meaning of that contention, for it is here that the source's description of the state of relations existing between the various nations under study is found. For example, if China frequently refers to joint Chinese and Soviet resolve to resist aggression in Vietnam, while the USSR consistently alludes only to Chinese steadfastness on this issue, then there is an apparent effort on the part of China to present a united show of strength on Vietnam, and an apparent reluctance on the part of the Soviets to become involved in this issue.

It may be inferred, then, that the concentration of references to joint endeavors on the part of China and the Soviet Union, and references to the individual actions of each, may vary considerably with each source, and when these differences are related to the issues and categories involved, there may well be reflected facets of the relations existing between the two countries.

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V. Conclusion: Since the state of relations between China and the Soviet Union cannot be assessed for any given period, there is no precedent for relating propaganda to this problem. Therefore, there is no alternative but to postulate the propaganda conditions for assumed states of relations between the two countries. This operation is now in progress. For the purposes of this analysis, three basic characterizations of the relations between China and the USSR have been assumed: excellent, poor, and a middle ground, called "normal." It is further assumed that either country may consider that relations are characterized by any one of the three conditions. This leaves nine alternative states of relations existing between China and the USSR. (The USSR may feel that relations are excellent, while China is dissatisfied; both may feel that relations are poor, etc.)

Until "norms" of propaganda behavior (in terms of the categories, contexts, etc. of this analysis) can be established over a period of time, the chances are poor for ascertaining any but the more extreme conditions. However, the analysis of what is said by China and the USSR to whom, in what context, and in what manner in the propaganda surrounding the Sino-Soviet Pact anniversaries should contribute in some measure to determining the existing state of relations between the two and should have an excellent chance of revealing the more extreme changes in the condition of relations between them.


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TAB B

Propaganda on the Sino-Soviet Treaty Anniversaries



*See footnote on page 13.


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LEGEND: Soviet Propaganda ———
 Chinese Propaganda - - - - -

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TAB B, Cont.

Propaganda on the Sino-Soviet Treaty AnniversariesCONTEXT CATEGORIES

LEGEND: Soviet Propaganda ———
 Chinese Propaganda - - - -

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